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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) achieve state-of-the-art
performance on numerous applications. However, it is dif-
ficult to tell beforehand if a DNN receiving an input will
deliver the correct output since their decision criteria are
usually nontransparent. A DNN delivers the correct output
if the input is within the area enclosed by its generalization
envelope. In this case, the information contained in the in-
put sample is processed reasonably by the network. It is
of large practical importance to assess at inference time if
a DNN generalizes correctly. Currently, the approaches to
achieve this goal are investigated in different problem set-
ups rather independently from one another, leading to three
main research and literature fields: predictive uncertainty,
out-of-distribution detection and adversarial example de-
tection. This survey connects the three fields within the
larger framework of investigating the generalization per-
formance of machine learning methods and in particular
DNNs. We underline the common ground, point at the most
promising approaches and give a structured overview of the
methods that provide at inference time means to establish if
the current input is within the generalization envelope of a
DNN.
1. Introduction
Generalization is the ability of a classifier to correctly
predict the class of previous unseen data points. In machine
learning the classifier’s decisions are derived from a train-
ing set. How well the derived decision criteria generalize is
tested by using an additional test set containing unseen data,
which is sampled from the same distribution as the training
set. A good performance on the training set in combination
with a poor performance on the test set is usually related to
a lack of generalization ability. After the development of a
classifier is finished, a poor performance on a data sample
at inference time can often be traced back to a distribution
shift between the development and inference data. For im-
proved classification performance it is important to detect
such situations in which the input has left the generalization
area of the classifier.
Statistical analysis of the generalization potential of a clas-
sifier for the purpose of optimizing its parameters during
training, has led well known results such as the Probably
Approximately Correct (PAC) Theory [76]. Generaliza-
tion was investigated as a combination of properly sampled
training data and simpler decision method.
Recently, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are the most suc-
cessful machine learning methods for various tasks such as
computer vision, speech recognition and object-detection
[16], [43], [24]. DNNs make use of non-linearities in com-
bination with simple matrix multiplications and an efficient
data driven training procedure. This allows for complex
deep structures and hence grasping the connection between
the input and the output is usually not trivial. The deeper
and hence more complex the neural network is, the less
transparent and comprehensible is its correlation-based be-
havior. Usually humans, using their mostly causality-based
intuition, are not able to tell why a DNN produced a certain
output, which would be a major step in understanding their
generalization behavior.
A possible solution to this dilemma is to decide for each in-
put at inference time, if the DNN is likely to predict the cor-
rect output. Consequently research currently focuses on de-
veloping dedicated, separated generalization-detector meth-
ods that detect if the current input is within the correspond-
ing generalization area of DNNs. In general this is done
by analyzing the relationship between the input sample and
the training set eventually complemented by an analysis of
the information flow within the Network. These approaches
largely replaced methods where a confidence in the result is
computed from the DNN themselves (e.g., with the help of a
softmax layer), as these tend to be overconfident [27], [62].
A generalization detector is illustrated in Figure 1. A DNN
receives an input on which it performs its classification task.
The generalization detector now has to decide, based on the
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Figure 1. A detector deciding at inference time for a given data
sample if it is within the generalization area of a DNN.
input and the behavior of the DNN, if this input is within the
generalization area. From that information directly follows
if its prediction is probably correct or incorrect. The inten-
tion of this paper is to give an overview and compare gener-
alization detection methods that decide at inference time for
a given data sample if it is within the generalization area of
a DNN. Even though this setup is valid for any application
of DNNs, we concentrate here on image classification, as
currently one of the best investigated areas in that field.
The current literature in the field of generalization detection
methods at inference time can be split into three main fields:
predictive uncertainty, out-of-distribution detection and ad-
versarial example detection. Predictive uncertainty mainly
concentrates on set-ups only containing data sampled from
the same distribution. The goal is to assign a high uncer-
tainty to the samples that lead to a misclassification. Out-of-
distribution detection deals with data that is different to the
training data in a principled manner, often including classes
unknown to the DNN, which as well leads to a misclassifi-
cation. The adversarial example detection field concentrates
on detecting samples that are carefully generated from the
training set in order to fool the DNN.
Until now those research areas are usually treated seperatly
and methods belonging to one sector are only evaluated on
its corresponding research setups. We strive here for a com-
plete overview of all different sectors and their correspond-
ing methods.
In Section 2 we introduce relevant keywords and the
mathematical definitions necessary to explain the detection
methods given in Section 4. The related work is captured in
Section 3. The following Section is divided into the three
research categories listed above. We list the method’s differ-
ent properties and discuss their similarities and differences
in Section 5. Finally we draw our conclusion in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first give an overview of generaliza-
tion, then we describe the setup of our survey focusing on
concepts and notation.
2.1. Generalization Overview
Consider a classifier that is trained on a training set sam-
pled from an unknown distribution. We do not know a-
priori if the training set represents a proper sample or not,
where a proper sample is one that allows us to perfectly re-
construct the unknown distribution. We wish that the clas-
sifier that we devise using the potentially improper training
sample is able to generalize, which means that its perfor-
mance at inference time is good on any sample of the distri-
bution.
One possibility to obtain good generalization performance
is to use a stable classifier. A stable classifier has limited
variance with respect to the training set. The core idea is
that the same classifier is found by a convergent training
procedure irrespective if the training set consists of only
an improper (and usually limited) or a proper (and usually
large) sample of the distribution. With a stable classifier
we need to ensure during training that we find the one that
works for the entire unknown distribution such as to achieve
our goal of good generalization.
The usual way to obtain a stable classifier is to limit the
hypothesis space that it covers. The parameters of the clas-
sifier are then found such as to minimize the empirical error
computed on the training set. The empirical error measured
on the test data is used as an approximation of the error
on all data. Clearly, this approximation is better the more
data is available. Thus, in this case generalization is under-
stood mainly in relation to properties of the function imple-
menting the classifier and also in relation to the empirical
error. This approach with its bias-variance trade-off flavor,
inspired the support vector machines [79], [78] whose linear
decision surface is constructed to ensure high generalization
ability [13].
In the DNN context, generalization is the ability to perform
well on previously unobserved input data [5]. During train-
ing the generalization ability is approximated mainly by the
empirical error as the hypothesis space covered by DNNs
is infinite [31]. Particular design choices what the archi-
tecture of the DNN solution and the training procedure are
concerned are made such as to further improve the general-
ization. The validity of these design choices is typically in-
vestigated with the help of data sampled from the unknown
distribution independently of the data set.
2.2. Concepts
Consider an image classification problem. For such a
problem the underlaying problem-space consists of all im-
ages that can be meaningfully assigned to one of the classes.
The problem-space is usually modeled statistically and each
possible image represents a realization of the model.
In order to develop a DNN a finite set of images, a problem-
space sample is necessary. Since the original distribution of
the problem-space is usually unknown, it is estimated from
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the problem-space sample. An image sampled from this es-
timated distribution is denoted as in-distribution.
Starting from a problem-space sample a classification DNN
defines a feature space in which the images of a problem-
space sample can be separated. In doing so it is able to
generalize from the training sample that is usually a sub-
set of the problem-space sample to any sample from the
problem-space distribution. The generalization error is es-
timated using a test set which usually is another subset of
the development problem-space sample, independent of the
training set.
The generalization envelope of a DNN encloses the general-
ization area, the region of the problem-space for which the
network decides reasonably correct on both previously seen
and unseen input samples at inference time. An inference-
time error on an input sample is a generalization error.
We illustrate our set-up in Figure 2, which shows an ex-
ample of a two dimensional feature space with a general-
ization area for a classification problem. The blue and red
dots represent the data of two classes. A DNN is trained
on a problem-space sample and finds the orange decision
boundary which splits the whole input space into two areas
in which the data would be classified. The area in which
the network is able to predict correctly is the generaliza-
tion area visualized in green. Conversely, a correct decision
given the combination of training data, classifier architec-
ture and training process can not be guaranteed within the
white area. As depicted in Figure 2 there are typically three
main sources of error leading to misclassification at infer-
ence time: (High) uncertainty samples close to the separa-
tion surface, out-of-distribution samples located outside the
problem-space or far in the tail of the problem-space distri-
bution as approximated from the problem-space sample and
adversarial samples which are samples from within or out-
side the problem-space purposefully selected or constructed
such as a misclassification occurs, typically in regions of
low uncertainty.
Uncertainty can be separated into epistemic, which refers
to uncertainty in the model predictions, and aleatoric uncer-
tainty, which captures noise inherent in the data. In prac-
tice it is often not possible to decide which kind of uncer-
tainty caused a misclassification. The uncertainty informa-
tion can not be entangled and therefore most uncertainty
predictors are constructed to measure the combined uncer-
tainty. Hence, in the following the term uncertainty includes
epistemic as well as aleatoric uncertainty. As visualized in
Figure 2 high uncertainty is observed in regions close to a
decision boundary, either the decision boundary is slightly
misplaced or noise in the data caused a small misplacement
of the sample in the feature space. As usual in the litera-
ture we use additionally to the term uncertainty its antonym
confidence, a high confidence implies a low uncertainty and
vice versa. If for an input x, the DNN’s output has a high
Figure 2. A feature space with a possible generalization area
(green) for a classifier (orange) trained on a two class problem.
For further details see section 2.2.
uncertainty we assign a higher probability to the event that
x lays outside the generalization area. Conversely, a low
uncertainty does not necessarily imply a smaller probability
that the corresponding input lays outside the generalization
area.
Out-of-distribution samples are often referred to as anoma-
lies. They are different in a general way from the train-
ing samples. Either they are sampled from a part of the
problem-space not covered by the distribution estimated af-
ter training or they do not even belong to the problem-space.
Some possible out-of-distribution samples are marked at the
right hand side of Figure 2. The pink color marks the fact
that they are not in the problem-space.
The third class are adversarial examples. They are con-
structed in order to fool the DNN by performing small
changes on an image such that a huge shift in the feature
space is achieved. The sample is thus shifted to the wrong
side of the decision boundary in the feature space which
leads to a misclassification. Alternatively, images from out-
side the problem-space are shifted into regions of low uncer-
tainty in the feature space. As shown in Figure 2 adversarial
images are often close to correct classified images from the
wrongly predicted class.
The literature on the detection of samples outside the gen-
eralization area may be divided into three main fields: pre-
dictive uncertainty, out-of-distribution detection and adver-
sarial example detection. Each field relates to a part of the
question how to determine if an input has left the generaliza-
tion area of a DNN. Further relations and specific technical
definitions are introduced and described in the following in
Section 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.
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2.3. Mathematical notation
For quick reference we have gathered in Table 1 the most
important mathematical terms that we use. Next we de-
scribe these in more detail.
In the classification setup a DNN is a function F (·) that
computes for an input x ∈ Rn an output F (x) ∈ Rm. The
output F (x) contains scores, one for each possible class.
The maximal score defines the predicted class label y
y = argmax
i∈{1,...,m}
F (x)i .
Often, the last layer contains a softmax function that nor-
malizes the final class scores
F (x) ∈ [0, 1]m, s.t.
m∑
i=1
(F (x))i = 1 .
Each DNN consists of several layers f j , j ∈ {1, ..., k}
F (x) = f (k)(. . . f (2)(f (1)(x))) .
Usually each layer is a function on the output of the pre-
vious layer. Depending on the architecture and application
area of the DNN, there are different kinds of layers, e.g.
fully connected, convolutional or pooling layers. Often, the
last layer contains a softmax activation. The parameters
of these layers are the network’s weights Θ. The weights
are optimized using a training set that contains input-output
pairs (x, l). The output labels l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} hold the cor-
rect class for the inputs x. During training, the weights Θ
are iteratively updated such that the loss L(F (x), l), which
compares the network output to the true label for samples
from the training set, is reduced.
The task for our work is to find a detector method DF (·)
that states at inference time for any possible input x if it
is within the generalization area of the DNN F (·). Based
on the input x, the way the DNN processes x, and the out-
put F (x), the detector DF (·) returns a value DF (x) ∈ R,
which in combination with a threshold T ∈ R defines if x
is expected to be within the generalization area or not:
DF (x) < T → x within generalization area
DF (x) ≥ T → x not within generalization area .
Sometimes there is no hard decision needed, but the prob-
ability how likely the classification decision of the network
is. This probability information can be achieved by defining
a monotonously increasing function
M : R→ [0, 1],
that maps the output of DF (x) onto the interval [0, 1]. The
closerM(DF (x)) is to one the more likely the input is mis-
classified. The closer the value is to zero, the more likely
the classification result of the DNN is correct.
Table 1. Nomenclature
x input data, in our case an image x ∈ Rn
l class label for an image l ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
m is the number of possible classes
F (·) DNN for classification F : Rn → [0, 1]m,
x 7→ F (x) s.t. ∑mi=1 F (x)i = 1
y predicted class y ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
y = argmaxi∈{1,··· ,m} F (x)i
L(·, ·) loss function L : [0, 1]m × [0, 1]m → R,
(F (x), l) 7→ L(F (x), l) compares the output
F (x) of x to the label l to train the DNN
θ parameters of a DNN
DF (·) detector DF (·) : Rn → R, x 7→ DF (x)
predicts if x is within (D(F, x) < T )
or outside (D(F, x) ≥ T ) the generalization
area of F ; T is a predefined threshold
3. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no other
contributions focusing on the generalization capabilities of
Machine Learning and in particular Deep Learning meth-
ods, as the root cause for research in the fields of, uncer-
tainty estimation, out-of-distribution detection and adver-
sarial examples.
Recently the most important methods in the area of uncer-
tainty estimation have been benchmarked [35], [64].
There are numerous surveys reviewing literature on out-of-
distribution detection, which is also referred to as anomaly
detection, especially in a context different from deep learn-
ing. Some review anomaly detection in general [12], [68].
Others specialize on various setups such as data mining
techniques [3] or on application areas as e.g. the medical
domain or video-related anomaly detection[41], [50]. In
general those surveys that touch upon deep learning do not
focus on anomalous behavior in combination with a prede-
fined classifier [11], [1] and limit themselves to analyzing
the training data. Detailed information on anomaly detec-
tion based on machine learning procedures is collected in
several books [19], [57], [2].
Surveys on adversarial examples usually review literature
on that topic in general and only include a section on adver-
sarial example detection [85], [4], [10].
Bulusu et al. [8] focus on out-of-distribution and adversar-
ial example detection methods applied on top of pre-trained
DNNs. Different to our survey however, they do not use
generalization to provide an unifying look on both fields
and leave out predictive uncertainty..
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Figure 3. Taxonomy of methods detecting samples outside the generalization area at inference time.
4. Detecting Samples Outside the Generaliza-
tion Area
In the following we introduce each literature field and
discuss their detection methods thus setting the stage for
a discussion focusing on the core principles they share (s.
Section 5.2). As shown in Figure 3 the core principles are:
metric, inconsistency, generative and ensemble based meth-
ods. The various literature contributions within each cate-
gory are arranged in ascending chronological order of their
appearance.
4.1. Predictive Uncertainty
For classification tasks the output values F (x) of the
DNN are usually understood as the corresponding probabil-
ities of the sample x belonging to class y. Against expec-
tations it has been shown that this confidence score is mis-
leading, as the DNNs tend to be overconfident [27], [62].
Initial research on predictive uncertainty in the DNN-based
classification context concentrated on adapting the output
such that its values better approximate the actual probabil-
ity distribution p(y|x).
The methods from the predictive uncertainty field are
among the first attempts to investigate generalization at in-
ference time, being older than out-of-distribution detection
and adversarial example detection. Most procedures were
originally constructed for regression problems, and were
computationally cheap. Typically an ensemble of real world
regression datasets first introduced by [36] was used as eval-
uation set.
Later, Ovadia et al. [64] performed some image classifica-
tion experiments on the most prevalent, scalable and practi-
cally applicable predictive-uncertainty deep-learning meth-
ods. To determine how well the predicted vector F (x) fits
the probability distribution of the corresponding probability
p(y|x) for each class y different evaluation scores are used
such as the Negative Log-Likelihood, the Brier Score and
the Expected Calibration Error.
The Negative Log-Likelihood for N sample pairs (xi, li) is
defined as
NLL = −
∑
i∈{1,...,N}
log(F (xi)li) .
It is also referred to as the cross entropy loss [25]. It is
a proper score, which means that the value NLL is only
minimized if the predicted probability distribution equals
the groundtruth distribution.
Another proper score is the Brier Score [7] which is for N
sample pairs (xi, li), i ∈ {1, . . . , N} given as
BS =
1
N
∑
i∈{1,...,N}
∑
j∈{1,...,m}
(F (xi)j − 1{li}(j))2 .
It can be explained as a decomposition between calibration
and refinement, for further explanation we refer to [14].
The Expected Calibration Error [60] is popular and intu-
itive. The evaluation data is split into S disjoint buckets
Bs, s ∈ {1, . . . , S} and the average gap of within bucket
accuracy and within bucket predicted probability is mea-
sured
ECE =
∑
s∈{1,...,S}
|Bs|
n
|acc(Bs)− conf(Bs)| .
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The accuracy and the confidence of a bucket Bs with la-
beled samples (xi, li) and the corresponding predicted class
yi, i ∈ Bs is given as
acc(Bs) =
1
|Bs|
∑
i∈Bs
1{li}(yi)
conf(Bs) =
1
|Bs|
∑
i∈Bs
F (x)yi .
The ECE is not a proper score, since e.g. returning the
same value for all F (x)i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} yields perfect
calibrated, but non-usable predictions [64].
Next we explain the predictive uncertainty methods and
group them according to their core principle into metric
based and ensemble based approaches.
4.1.1 Metric Methods
Metric-based methods investigate if for the current input
data sample the classifier behaves similarly to the samples
inside the generalization area. The training set is often used
as the set of samples inside the generalization area. How
similar the behaviors for two samples are is established by
measuring the differences among them with the help of
a function and comparing its output against a threshold.
Typically the function used is a composition of some
transformation and a metric. If a significant dissimilarity
from the current sample to the samples from the inside of
the generalization area is observed, the sample is expected
to be outside the generalization envelope.
The only metric method in the literature field predictive
uncertainty was proposed by Guo et al. [30]. Their simple
method called temperature scaling ”softens” the output
F (x) of the DNN. This is achieved by dividing the values
of each class by a temperature T > 1 before the softmax
layer. The exact value of T is statistically derived from
samples inside the generalization area. This procedure
leaves the class prediction unchanged, since the parameter
T does not change the maximum, but the output values
are softened, such that the output is less overconfident
and hence more reliable. If the derived output value for
the predicted class is much smaller than the output value
for samples inside the generalization area, the sample is
expected to be outside the generalization area.
4.1.2 Ensemble Methods
Ensemble methods usually apply the current input to several
networks and analyse their outputs. The outputs are either
combined to one output using an average procedure or the
Figure 4. Visualization of the method from Blundell et al. [6].
difference of the different outputs is computed. The more
similar the components of the averaged output vector are, or
the more the outputs of the individual networks differ, the
more likely is the event that the investigated input sample is
outside the generalization area.
One well known Bayesian Neural Network method is
based on variational inference, in which an approximating
distribution is constructed for each weight [28], [6], [51],
[52], [81]. Hence, the weights of the network are no longer
fixed values but are represented by a probability distribu-
tion, compare Figure 4. One of the most popular Bayesian
Neural Networks ideas is that from Blundell et al., since he
was the first to introduce an algorithm for training Bayesian
Neural Network using backpropagation [6]. At inference
time several concrete weight values are sampled from
their corresponding distribution. The different samples are
used to build an ensemble of networks. The input is run
through each network and the outputs are combined using
a weighted average.
Gal et al. introduced a method that is called Monte Carlo
dropout or dropout at inference time [22]. Different from
the standard dropout procedure [75], in which dropout
is used to prevent overfitting by randomly deleting con-
nections, in Monte Carlo Dropout this masking is also
applied at test time. Hence, the prediction is no longer
deterministic. Depending on the links randomly chosen to
be kept, the networks output is different. For one input the
network is run several times using different masks. The
output results are averaged.
Lakshminarayanan et al. also use an ensemble based
method [42]. They randomly initialize several networks
and train them on the same dataset. Additionally they use
adversarial training, which means that they incorporate ad-
versarial images in the training dataset to keep the models
more robust against adversarial attacks. At inference time
each DNN is run for the current input image and the output
results are averaged.
Riquelment et al. proposed two methods [70]. One relies on
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variational inference [6], the other on Monte-Carlo dropout
[22]. In order to enforce a lower computational overhead
they incorporated the corresponding procedure only in the
last layer of the network. Hence, the computation until the
last layer stays the same for each input. Only in the last
layer different weight settings need to be sampled and the
corresponding output computed.
4.2. Out-of-Distribution Detection
Out-of-distribution detection methods search for input
samples that stem from another distribution than the sam-
ples used to train the DNN. In the evaluation procedure
additional datasets are used, which either contain inputs of
different classes than the training classes or inputs with ad-
ditional random noise. Some set-ups also include out-of-
distribution images of classes the network is actually trained
for but the images occur in a different representation. An
example would be to feed images from the SVHN dataset
[61] which contains images of house numbers in a DNN
that is trained to classify images from the handwritten digit
dataset MNIST [44]. Such cases are referred to as novelty
detection in literature and, often treated as subproblem of
the out-of-distribution detection.
Typically classification data sets used for out-of-distribution
detection are CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [39], SVHN [61],
ImageNet [15] and LSUN [83]. A DNN is trained on one
of the datasets, the other datasets are then used as out-of-
distribution data.
In the out-of-distribution detection set-up there are two
classes, the inlier class covering the generalization area and
the outlier class. A generalization detector returns for a
sample x and the corresponding behavior of the DNN a
score. The higher the score the more likely the sample x
is an outlier, the lower, the more likely x is an inlier. To get
a hard decision for x to be an inlier or an outlier, a decision
threshold T has to be determined.
The ratio between False-Positive-Rate (FPR), and the True-
Positive-Rate (TPR) is directly linked to the value T . How-
ever, depending on the problem and the corresponding re-
quirements different ratios between the two rates can be
desired and thus a threshold-independent evaluation metric
is needed. For this purpose, the Area Under the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (AUROC/AUCROC) is typically
used. This is the are under the plot of the true positive rate
over the false positive rate. A 100% AUROC value corre-
sponds to a perfect detector, while a 50%AUROC to a de-
tector deciding at random.
Should the positive and negative classes have different base
rates, the AUROC score can be misleading. In such a case
it can make sense to use the Area under the precision recall
curve (AUPR). It is defined as the area under the plot of the
precision over the recall. Here, in contrary to the AUROC it
Figure 5. Visualization of the method from DeVries et al., image
adapted from [17].
makes a difference whether inliers or outliers are assigned
to be negative or positive [33].
Lastly, sometimes the False positive rate at e.g. 95 % true
positive rate is used. The threshold T is chosen such that
the true positive rate is at 95% and the according value of
the false positive rate is used for comparison.
Usually, the test data is adapted to have a ratio of one be-
tween the numbers of samples in the positive and negative
class and the AUROC score is used for evaluation.
The corresponding methods from the literature field out-of-
distribution detection can be grouped into metric, inconsis-
tency, generative and ensemble approaches. In the follow-
ing, the methods are listed according to their group.
4.2.1 Metric Methods
As already mentioned, metric methods determine if the be-
havior of the current input is similar to the behavior of sam-
ples inside the generalization area of the DNN under inves-
tigation. Again, the training samples are used as samples
inside the generalization area and similarity is typically es-
tablished using a transformation and a metric. In this case
however, the transformation may be applied on the input
data, the output of one or several intermediate layers or the
gradient computed on the loss function of the current input-
output combination. A large distance computed by the met-
ric indicates a sample outside the generalization area.
DeVries et al. proposed a method in which an usual classifi-
cation DNN is adopted such that it outputs a detection value
c additionally to the softmax scores [17], compare Figure 5.
To train the network they use a two-folded loss function L˜.
On the one hand it interpolates the softmax output y with
the true class one-hot label l and hence lowers the classifi-
cation loss if c is low, and on the other hand it is penalizing
a small confidence score c
L˜((y, c), l) = L(y + (1− c) · l, l) + log(c) .
Via this training process the detecting transformation and
the metric based on the layerwise output of the DNN is
directly incorporated in the network structure which is
different to most other metric methods. At inference time
a small value for c indicates that the sample is likely to be
outside the generalization area.
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Oberdiek et al. introduced a method that is based on
the layer-wise gradient of the weights regarding the loss
function of the predicted class [63]. From that they generate
features such as the layerwise norm, minimum and maxi-
mum values of the gradient. Those are fed together with
the entropy of the estimated class distribution to a logistic
regression approach that determines the score deciding if
the input is expected to be outside the generalization area.
Jiang et al. proposed a method that first defines for each
class a high density set consisting of images from the
training set of that according class [38]. At inference time
a trust score for the current input output combination is
computed by taking the ratio between the distance from the
test sample to the high density class set of the predicted
class and the distance to the second nearest high density
class set. The higher the trust score, the more the predicted
class is expected to be correct.
Another detector that is completely based on the activation
spaces of the DNN’s layers was introduced by Lee et al.
[45]. They compute the Mahalanobis distance to the closest
class-conditional Gaussian distribution. The layerwise
distances are then combined by a logistic regression
network stating if the input is likely to be outside the
generalization area. It is one of the only works yet that
evaluates the detector on both, adversarial examples and
out-of-distribution set-ups.
Hendrycks et al. adapts the training procedure of the
DNN [34]. They carefully construct a dataset contains
samples outside the generalization area that is different
from that used for testing. During training they use the
original training set with the original labels and additionally
samples from the constructed dataset for which they use
the uniform distribution over m classes as labels. An input
leading to an output with an higher entropy than samples
from the training set within the generalization area are
expected to be outside the generalization area.
A similar method was proposed by Hein et. al [32]. They
also use an additionally constructed dataset with samples
outside the generalization are for the training. During train-
ing the loss for such samples is defined by the maximal out-
put value over all classes. During testing a comparison of
the maximal output value to that of common samples inside
the generalization area is used to detect samples outside the
generalization area.
4.2.2 Inconsistency Methods
The core idea of prediction-inconsistency methods is to
observe the reaction of the DNN to small changes in
Figure 6. Visualization of the Method from Hendrycks et al. [33].
the input image, when the input image lays inside and
respectively outside the generalization area. At inference
time the current input sample and a slightly transformed
image are processed by the DNN. The corresponding
outputs are compared. The higher the difference in the
outputs the more the investigated sample is expected to be
outside the generalization area.
Liang et al. proposed a method in which the input image is
perturbed by shifting it away from the original class [48].
This is done similarly as in the adversarial example method
FGSM [27]: gradient descent is used to increase the loss
regarding the predicted class and hence a slightly modified
image is generated. A sample is expected to be inside the
generalization area, if the output value of the modified im-
age for the original predicted class is high.
4.2.3 Generative Methods
Generative methods make use of an image pre-processing
procedure. The idea is somewhat similar to the prediction-
inconsistency approaches, but the pre-processing procedure
is more sophisticated since it is generated in order to shift
the image in the direction of the training distribution. The
shift is realized using a generative network or similar which
is trained on the training set. At inference time both the cur-
rent input image and the corresponding output of the gener-
ative network (i.e., the result of applying the pre-processing
procedure on the input image) are processed by the DNN.
The more the outputs differ, the more the input sample is
assumed to be outside the generalization area.
Hendrycks et al. proposed a method that requires changes
in the original DNN [33]. As shown in Figure 6 in purple,
they attach an encoder on top of the penultimate layer of
the original DNN, that reconstructs the input image. The
difference between the encoder output and the input image
is then fed together with the output of the penultimate and
last layer to a so called abnormality module shown in red
which is trained to output the generalization score for the
prediction.
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Ren et al. introduced a method that is based on a likelihood
ratio statistic [69]. They train two generative models called
PixelCNNs [71] on training samples that additionally
returns how likely an input is side the generalization area.
One model is trained on the original training dataset and
the other one on slightly perturbed images from the training
dataset. They suppose that both models are able to capture
background but that the model trained on the original
training dataset is more sensitive regarding the actual
content part. Hence, if the likelihood ratio determined
between the output of the model trained on the original
images and the one on the perturbed images is low, the
input image is expected to be outside the generalization
area.
Serra` et al. show that images with high complexity tend to
produce lowest likelihoods for generative models [73]. This
leads to wrong predictions if the sample outside the gener-
alization area has a lower complexity than the actual data
inside the generalization area. They balance this effect in a
method, that takes both the predicted log-likelihood of gen-
erative models and the quantitative estimates of complexity
of an image into account to decide whether this image is
outside the generalization area. They use several different
generative models in order to evaluate their method.
4.2.4 Ensemble Methods
As described in Section 4.1.2, ensemble methods use
several slightly different networks, the more the outputs of
those networks differ at inference time, the more the image
is expected to be outside the generalization area.
Vyas et al. splits the training data in k partitions, such
that each class is belonging to one partition [80]. Then
k independent but structure wise identical networks are
trained, each uses one of the partitions as data outside
the generalization area and the rest as in-distribution data.
Additional to the usual loss term, they use a term that
pushes the entropy over the softmax output of the network
below a threshold for samples outside the generalization
area and above the threshold for in-distribution samples.
During testing the softmax outputs of the classifiers are
averaged and the maximum value and the entropy are
combined and used as detection score.
Another ensemble based method was proposed by Yu et
al., they are training two networks, both on the same in-
and out-of-distribution examples [84]. For in-distribution
images they use an usual loss function, but for out-of-
distribution examples they use a loss that is thought to maxi-
mize the difference between the softmax outputs of the two
Figure 7. An original ”clean” image that is correctly predicted as
panda, the added perturbation computed by the fast gradient sign
method and the resulting adversarial example which is incorrectly
classified as gibbon, image adapted from [27].
networks. During testing they expect the input to be out-
side the generalization area if the L1-Norm of the difference
of the outputs of the two networks is above a predefined
threshold.
4.3. Adversarial Example Detection
Adversarial examples are artificially generated data sam-
ples that are carefully constructed to fool a network into
deciding falsely. Usually, an adversarial example xadv is
based on an original data sample x. The difference δ be-
tween those samples is constructed to be as small as pos-
sible under the constraint that the predicted class c(F (x))
changes
xadv = argmin
xadv
||x−xadv|| s.t. c(F (x)) 6= c(F (xadv)) .
The difference between the two samples is often not visible
to humans, as shown in Figure 7. This adversarial example,
for which the network predicts a gibbon instead of a panda
is constructed using the fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
by Goodfellow et al. [27], which is one of the first and
simplest adversarial attack methods. Instead of computing
the gradient of the loss function L(F (x), l) regarding the
weights θ of a model, the gradient regarding the image x
is computed. Then the adversarial image xadv is generated
by moving the original image x in a simple one step pro-
cedure in the direction of the steepest ascent regarding the
loss L(F (x), l), without exceeding the L1 norm difference
 to the original image.
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xL(θ, x, y)) .
The main adversarial example methods used for evaluating
adversarial example detectors are FGSM [27], BIM [40],
JSMA [67] and CW [9]. Typical datasets used for evalua-
tion are MNIST [44], CIFAR [39] and SVHN [61]. In order
to prove the scalability to large datasets some works addi-
tional evaluate their methods on the ImageNet dataset [15].
In the adversarial sample set-up usually the DNN is trained
on the training data. At inference time the DNN receives
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both, adversarial and clean images from the test set. The
task of the generalization detector is to decide whether the
pre-trained DNN has as input an adversarial example from
outside the generalization envelope and hence predicts the
wrong class, or if the current input data is clean and the net-
work predicts correctly.
The evaluation procedure for adversarial example detection
is similar to the evaluation of out-of-distribution detection
explained in Section 4.2, with the adversarial examples be-
ing considered outliers.
The methods for adversarial example detection can be
grouped into metric, inconsistency and generative. In the
following the methods are explained and listed according to
their core principle.
4.3.1 Metric Methods
As described in more detail in Section 4.2.1 the metric
methods use the information if the current input sample is
behaving similar to input samples inside the generalization
area that are taken from the training set. It is based on
a transformation and a metric applied on the input data,
on the output of one or several layers or on the gradient
computed on the loss function of the current input output
combination. A high difference in the behavior indicates
an adversarial sample laying outside the generalization area.
Grosse et al. introduced an approach that applied maximum
mean discrepancy on input data [29] from which a distance
to samples inside the generalization area is computed. This
was one of the first works for the detection of adversarial
examples. The main difference to the following works in
this category is that the procedure only depends on the
images, the information is independent from the behavior
of the DNN. It later showed that this method does not work
well for some adversarial attacks, hence following methods
in the metric based category took more information than
just the image space itself into account.
Metzen et al. proposed one of the first detectors that uses the
activation space of the DNN as decisive criterion [59]. On
top of each activation layer output they trained small sub-
networks that receive the activations of the original network
for each example as input. The subnetworks were trained
on data in- and outside the generalization area. A visualiza-
tion of this method can be seen in Figure 8. Based on that
information the subnetworks classify if the current example
is outside the generalization area. Metzen et al. found that
the subnetwork on one of the middle layers leads to the best
detection results.
Li and Li developed a detector that is using the output of
the convolutional layers in the DNN [46]. For each filter
Figure 8. Subnetworks for the detection task trained on the output
of the activation space. Original image from Metzen et al. [59].
output it collects statistical information from normalized
principal component analysis, minimal and maximal values
and several percentile values. Based on those statistics a
distance is computed to samples inside the generalization
area from the training set and a decision is made if the
current input behaves similar to previously investigated
image samples.
A two-folded detector was introduced by Feinman et al.
[20]. The main procedure is based on the Kernel Density
calculated on the activation space of each layer which is
then compared to samples of the training set. The second
procedure uses Bayesian Uncertainty determined from sev-
eral runs using dropout in the DNN. If one of the detectors
determines deviations from a normal behavior, the current
example is detected as being outside the generalization area.
A procedure based on local intrinsic dimensionality and
was developed by Ma et al. [55]. They characterize
subspaces outside the generalization area using local
intrinsic dimensionality on the layer outputs of the DNN
which is a weighted distance metric computed on the
k-nearest-neighbors of 100 randomly chosen examples
from the training set. The results of the different layers are
then combined by a logistic regression network.
A method also based on a k-nearest-neighbor approach was
proposed by Papernot et al. [66]. In each layer’s activation
space a input image of the k-nearest neighbor images of
the training set are determined. This method was actually
thought and is inserted as an example for several methods
that actual recover the actual class of the adversarial image
but could be easily updated: if the classes mismatch
to often with the predicted class of the current input im-
age, the image is likely to be outside the generalization area.
Zheng et al. proposed a method that fits for each class
on each activation space of the fully connected layers a
Gaussian Mixture Model [86]. The Gaussian Mixture
Model is trained by an expectation-maximization algorithm
[56]. For each class a threshold is chosen to reject inputs
whose Gaussian Mixture Models values are below that
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Figure 9. An illustration of the gradient based detector method of
Lust and Condurache [53].
threshold.
Pang et al. introduced a method based on the entropy of
normalized non-maximal elements (non-ME) of the predic-
tions of the network outputs F (x) [65]
non-ME(x) = −
∑
i 6=y
F (x)i · log(F (x)i) .
The training of the DNN is adapted with a loss function that
has an additional non-ME term, to keep the non-ME value
for samples outside the generalization area low. During
testing, an image x with a high non-ME value is expected
to be outside the generalization area.
As mentioned in section 4.2, the method proposed by Lee
et al. evaluated on the detection of adversarial examples as
well as out-of-distribution data [45]. It is one of the only
works yet, that evaluates the detector on both set-ups.
Ma et al. introduced an approach that is on the one hand
based on a one-class support vector machine on the activa-
tion layers, and on the other hand they apply on top of each
layer an additional fully connected softmax layer which
directly returns a softmax score class vector [54]. These
vectors are compared to each other. The more they differ,
the more probable the current example is misclassified.
Furthermore, the output of the support vector machine is
taken into account. The combined information decides
whether the current input is expected to be outside the
generalization area.
A similar procedure to Papernot et al.’s method [66] was
proposed by Dubey et al. [18]. It is using only a few
feature representations constructed from the activations
from different intermediate layers of the input image.
Those feature representations are compared to pre-saved
representations of labeled images from a large database.
Nearest neighbor search is used, followed by a weighted
combination of the predictions of the nearest neighbors
leading to a final class prediction. The approach is original
thought to recover the original class, but it can be adapted
to a detector and the image is supposed to be outside the
generalization area if the class predictions mismatch.
Figure 10. Visualization of the prediction inconsistency based ap-
proach of Xu et al. [82].
Recently Lust and Condurache introduced a detector based
on the gradient of the weights regarding the loss function
that compares the predicted class to the softmax output of
the network [53]. They use the layerwise norm of the gra-
dient as features in the logistic regression detector. Further-
more, they add a smoothing step in order to remove perturb-
ing noise and hence, in case of a sample outside the gener-
alization area, increase the contradictions of the weights to
the predicted class, compare Figure 9.
4.3.2 Inconsistency Methods
As described in Section 4.2.2 prediction-inconsistency
methods use the difference in the DNN output when
processing an input sample and a slightly modified input,
between samples that lay inside and outside the generaliza-
tion area. A large difference indicate a sample outside the
generalization area.
One of the first methods in this category was proposed by
Liang et al. [47]. They aim to remove adaptive noise from
the current input image and hence the perturbation by the
use of scalar quantization and a spatial smoothing filter. The
current input image and the generated clear image are then
classified by the DNN. If the class prediction for the two is
different, the image is supposed to be outside the general-
ization area.
The most successful approach in the prediction inconsis-
tency based approaches is if from Xu et al. and called fea-
ture squeezing [82]. The original image, an additional im-
age with reduced color depth generated from the original
image and a smoothed image are run through the DNN. The
outputs of the generated images are compared to the output
of the original image. If one of those differences exceeds
a threshold, the image is detected as an image outside the
generalization area.
4.3.3 Generative Methods
As described in Section 4.2.3 generative based methods
shift the input image in the direction of the training
distribution. A high difference in the outputs of the current
input image and the corresponding shifted image indicates
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Figure 11. The detector method of Liao et al. using a high-level
representation guided denoiser [49].
that the input image is outside the generalization area.
Meng et al. introduced MagNet, a two-pronged detection
method [58]. They use an auto-encoder that is trained to
reconstruct examples of the original dataset. Each input of
the DNN is additionally processed by the autoencoder and
a reconstructed image is achieved and as well run through
the DNN. If the current sample and its reconstruction differ
a lot or the difference between the DNN’s output of the
current image and the DNN’s output of the reconstructed
image is too high, the sample is supposed to be outside the
generalization area.
Song et al. proposed a method that is based on PixelCNN
[77], [71], a generative model with tractable likelihood
[74]. They train this PixelCNN on the original training
data. During testing each image is run through a procedure
in which each pixel of the image is modified such that
the log-likelihood of the PixelCNN is maximized. This
procedure is thought to remove the perturbation. If the class
prediction of the ”cleaned” image is different to the class
prediction of the original image, the image is supposed to
be outside the generalization area.
Defense-gan is a method proposed by Samangouei et al.
[72]. They train a Generative adversarial network (GAN)
[26] on the original dataset. Next they find an input z to
the generator part G of the GAN via an iterative procedure,
such that the output image G(z) is as similar as possible
to the current input image x of the DNN. The image G(z)
is then also fed into the DNN. Again, a difference in the
predicted class leads the method to predict the input to be
outside the generalization area.
Liao et al. proposed a similar detector method to MagNet.
They use a high-level representation guided denoiser [49]
which is instead of the typical encoder-decoder structure
based on a UNet structure to generate the reconstructed im-
age. It is trained on clean and adversarial images such that
adversarial images have the same DNN top-level outputs
as the corresponding non adversarial samples. The image
is classified as being outside the generalization area if the
class output of the denoised and the original image differs.
The method is visualized in Figure 11.
5. Discussion
In the following we discuss and summarize advantages
and disadvantages of the introduced methods. Important
comparison criteria are listed in Table 2. In the first sec-
tion, we clarify the used criteria and discuss the findings in
the second section.
5.1. Comparison Criteria
Table 2 captures the methods described in Section 4
ordered by their literature field and core principle.
The third column, no link to inference engine, defines
whether a method can be directly applied to any DNN. If
yes, the method belongs to the class of post-hoc procedures,
which means that a pre-trained DNN can be taken and
no further adaption is needed, this is marked by 3. If
e.g. a special loss function or additional layers needs to
be incorporated in the classification DNN and hence the
training process needs to be adapted, the method is marked
with an 7.
The column labeled no outlier modeling states if training
samples from the outlier class, e.g. adversarial or out-
of-distribution samples are necessary to train the detector
method. Here, we distinguish between 4 categories.
3 means the training of the method is completely outlier
independent. If the method is marked by (3) outliers are
necessary for the training of the method but the method is
(additionally) evaluated on a set-up in which the training
outliers were sampled from a different distribution than
the test outliers, the method was able to generalize well.
(7) means that they evaluate (additionally) on a set-up in
which the training outliers were sampled from a different
distribution than the test outliers but the method was not
able to generalize well. Methods that are evaluated only
on outlier set-ups they were in particularly trained for are
marked by 7.
In the additional parameter comparison we group the
methods into three subgroups. The first group consists
of detector methods that do not need many additional
parameters # in comparison to the classification DNN. If
the number of additional parameters is in the range of the
numbers of parameters needed for the DNN the methods
belong to the second group #G. Lastly, if the number of
parameters needed for the detection method is more than
twice the numbers of parameters needed for the DNN they
belong to the third group  .
For most methods the computational overhead is not
given within the corresponding paper and we did not
do any experiments on that. Due to the lack of precise
information we were not able to include an extra column
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Table 2. Compact comparison of detection methods. For further details on the comparison criteria see section 5.1.
Method reference
Core No link to No outlier Additional Publication
principle inference engine modeling parameters date
Literature Field: Predictive uncertainty methods
Guo et al. [30] Metric 3 - # 08.2017
Blundell et al. [6] Ensemble 7 - #G 06.2015
Gal et al. [22] Ensemble 7 - # 06.2016
Lakshminarayanan et al. [42] Ensemble 7 -  12.2017
Riquelme et al. [70] Ensemble 7 - # 05.2018
Literature Field: Out-of-distribution detection
DeVries et al. [17] Metric 7 (3) # 02.2018
Oberdiek et al. [63] Metric 3 (3) # 09.2018
Jiang et al. [38] Metric 3 7  12.2018
Lee et al. [45] Metric 3 (3)  12.2018
Hendrycks et al. [34] Metric 7 (3) # 04.2019
Hein et al. [32] Metric 7 (3) # 06.2019
Liang et al. [48] Inconsistency 3 7 # 04.2018
Hendrycks et al. [33] Generative 7 (3) #G 10.2016
Ren et al. [69] Generative 7 (3) #G 12.2019
Serra` et al. [73] Generative 3 3 #G 04.2020
Vyas et al. [80] Ensemble 7 3  09.2018
Yu et al. [84] Ensemble 7 7 #G 10.2019
Literature Field: Adversarial example detection
Grosse et al. [29] Metric 3 3 #G 02.2017
Metzen et al. [59] Metric 3 (7)  04.2017
Li and Li [46] Metric 3 7 #G 10.2017
Feinman et al. [20] Metric 3 7  11.2017
Ma et al. [55] Metric 3 7  03.2018
Papernot et al. [66] Metric 3 7  03.2018
Zheng et al. [86] Metric 3 3 #G 05.2018
Pang et al. [65] Metric 7 7 #G 12.2018
Lee et al. [45] Metric 3 (3)  12.2018
Ma et al. [54] Metric 3 3  02.2019
Dubey et al. [18] Metric 3 3  03.2019
Lust and Condurache [53] Metric 3 7 # 04.2020
Liang et al. [47] Inconsistency 3 (7) # 04.2018
Xu et al. [82] Inconsistency 3 (7) # 02.2018
Meng et al. [58] Generative 3 3 #G 05.2017
Song et al. [74] Generative 3 3 #G 10.2017
Samangouei et al. [72] Generative 3 7 #G 05.2018
Liao et al. [49] Generative 3 7 #G 06.2018
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for the computational efficiency in the table. However,
some rough estimations can be made. The most time
consuming methods are most likely the ensemble based
approaches, since here all the slightly different networks,
often two or more, have to process the same input. For the
other categories we expect the computational overhead to
be in the range of the parameter overhead, since usually
one parameter is related to one computation step. Thus,
the only methods needing significant fewer parameters and
computational overhead than the original network itself
are found within the metric based approaches category.
This information is relevant for applications in hardware
restricted areas as e.g. autonomous driving [23], [21].
The last column named publication date gives the month
and the year the method was introduced. For most papers
the performance of the introduced method is better than
the performances of earlier introduced methods. Some
works however concentrate on e.g. lowering the number of
parameters while maintaining a similar performance [53].
5.2. Findings
In Section 4 we introduced methods to detect at infer-
ence time if an input is within the generalization area of a
DNN. Currently, those methods can be found in three main
literature fields: predictive uncertainty, out-of-distribution
detection and adversarial example detection. Each litera-
ture field concentrates on a different reason for a sample to
not be within the generalization envelope.
Methods in the predictive uncertainty field try to deter-
mine the probability of in-distribution samples to be mis-
classified. For this purpose they typically focus on samples
that are close to a decision boundary and assign them a high
uncertainty. Approaches based on this idea, however, are
not capable of assigning a high uncertainty to samples that
are not close to any decision boundary but still not within
the generalization area.
Samples far away from the decision boundary and out-
side the generalization area are considered in the literature
field out-of-distribution detection. A sample is out-of-
distribution if it is different from the training samples in a
principled manner.
The third literature field is adversarial example detection.
Adversarial examples are constructed or selected such as
to fool the DNN on purpose. For the construction of an
adversarial image an in-distribution input image is slightly
changed so that the relevant features for the DNN’s decision
point to the wrong class. The change in the image is hardly
perceivable by humans or at least of a nature not impair-
ing a correct decision. Adversarial examples are often nei-
ther close to a decision boundary in the features space, nor
far away from in-distribution examples. This sets this field
apart from predictive uncertainty and out-of-distribution.
These fields are currently considered separately, even
though the same core principles are used to handle the un-
derlying generalization deficiencies. These core principles
lead to specific approaches, that we have identified and
gathered into: ensemble methods, inconsistency methods,
generative methods and metric methods. The structural base
of each core principle is shown in Figure 12.
Ensemble methods use several DNNs each trained slightly
different. At inference time they are all applied on the in-
put. The more their outputs differ the higher the chance that
the decision for that input is wrong. This concept works
well for samples that are close to a decision boundary, since
for all the different networks the decision boundary varies
slightly. However, out-of-distribution and certain types of
adversarial samples are usually found far away from the de-
cision boundary in the feature space. For those adversar-
ial examples that are in the problem space or even close to
the decision boundary, ensemble methods are less suited, as
DNNs trained on the same data are vulnerable to the same
attacks — adversarial examples exhibit a closer relationship
to the training dataset than to the training procedure itself
[37]. Thus, most ensemble based methods are mainly found
in the predictive uncertainty category and none in the field
of adversarial example detection. The two methods in the
out-of-distribution category are slightly different to those
of the predictive-uncertainty since they use for training an
additional data set containing samples from outside the ex-
pected generalization area (i.e., the problem space). During
the training the DNNs are forced to produce strongly differ-
ent outputs when receiving inputs from outside the expected
generalization area.
Inconsistency methods use the idea, that for misclassified
inputs the classification output is more sensitive to small
changes in the input sample. A high difference between
the outputs of an input image and the slightly transformed
image indicates the input to be outside the generalization
area. These assumptions fit particularly the adversarial ex-
amples detection setup and less the out-of-distribution and
the predictive uncertainty setup. The inconsistency methods
in the adversarial example field tend to fail for adversarial
examples on more complex datasets since relatively simple
noise-reduction procedures currently used were not able to
remove the adversarial noise without distortion also impor-
tant parts of the input [82], [54]. The only inconsistency-
based method for out-of-distribution images adds additional
noise to the input such as to shift the sample away from the
predicted class. This procedure shows some success but is
outperformed by newer out-of-distribution detection meth-
ods using other core principles than inconsistency.
In the case of generative methods the images are shifted
during a pre-processing procedure towards the generaliza-
tion envelope, often assuming that this is found close to the
training data. A difference between the outputs of the DNN
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Figure 12. The structural bases of the methods of the four core principles: ensemble, generative, metric and inconsistency. At inference
time they decide if the input sample x is inside (yes) or outside (no) the generalization area and hence if the predicted class based on the
output F(x) is expected to be correct.
computed from the shifted and the original input is then
used as an indicator for an input outside the generalization
area. In contrast to inconsistency methods here we do fo-
cus with the generator model on the setup that we know and
for which we have evidence in the form of correctly clas-
sified samples. Intuitively, in-distribution samples are left
untouched, while for the others, the generator model is sup-
posed to eliminate the features that are responsible for this,
which in turn is expected to lead to a shift in classification
output. The underlying assumptions of generative methods
are rather well suited for adversarial and out-of-distribution
samples, but do not fit that well the predictive uncertainty
setup.
The most promising methods are metric methods, which
can be found in all three categories. They also hold the only
method that is evaluated on an adversarial as well as on an
out-of-distribution set-up [45]. They typically compare the
DNN’s outputs or gradients of several layers to the corre-
sponding outputs of the training samples that have been in-
vestigated before using some metric. Unfortunately, they
usually need an additional set with samples outside the gen-
eralization area for their training process in order to cali-
brate the threshold used for deciding when a sample lays
outside the generalization area. However, as shown in some
works [32],[45], it is possible to find methods that are able
to train on one outlier class and to generalize well to a dif-
ferent one. Methods using this core principle often take a
closer look on how the input is processed in the DNN. They
take thus into consideration the possibility that the reasons
for the lack of generalization might be hidden deep in the
information flow within the DNN but are blurred in the ac-
tual output. Furthermore, the metric methods hold the most
efficient methods both what the number of parameters and
the computation time are considered, as described in Sec-
tion 5.1.
There are a lot of promising methods for each of the differ-
ent literature fields, but due to the lack of evaluation variety
for each method it is not possible to tell which method is
best when applied to the combined task of detecting sam-
ples outside the generalization area. Most detection meth-
ods just focus on one of the literature fields. Only metric
methods have been shown to achieve good results on more
than one detection task (out-of-distribution and adversarial
example detection).
6. Conclusion
There is a general interest for improving DNN perfor-
mance by analyzing the generalization behavior. However,
despite good performance in numerous problem setups,
grasping the generalization behavior of DNNs represents
an open research field. Its significance rises even more
with the advent of safety-critical DNN applications like for
example autonomous driving. In such cases understanding
the generalization behavior represents a cornerstone of a
coherent safety argumentation, which in turn is paramount
for the wide public acceptance of such solutions.
This paper presented a comprehensive survey covering the
methods thought to detect at inference time if an input is
within the generalization area of a DNN with a focus on
the task of image classification.
There can be different reasons for a sample not to be within
the generalization area. In general we may either have to do
with naturally occurring samples that lay outside the gen-
eralization area or in the case of adversarial examples, the
input samples are selected on purpose or even engineered
such as to lay outside the generalization area. However, the
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underlaying cause of the error in classification, irrespective
of the setup, is that the DNN does not generalize correctly.
From this perspective, all setups are equivalent and hence
this paper reviews all corresponding contributions and sets
them into the common broader generalization context.
The generalization issues often stem from the fact that
the feature projection learned during training is such
that it contains bad modes that afflict separability. Thus,
significant and decision-influencing differences between
inputs do not correspond to large-enough distances in the
feature space. So we either have no separability in the
feature space or we have it but it is ignored during training.
An analysis of the generalization behavior of a DNN can
be used both during training and at inference time. During
training the results of the analysis are used to build the
optimal pair of feature extractor and decision surface given
the available data. This setup has been studied extensively
and it still lays in the focus of research.
At inference time the common practice for investigating
the generalization behavior, was to define confidence
measures on the base of layer-wise neuron activations
computed using the weights established during training.
This however, leads often to misleading results, as the
DNNs tend to be overconfident in their decision as mea-
sured by the relative significance allocated to the winning
class. Predictive uncertainty methods improve upon this
approach but usually focus mainly on the region of the
input/feature space close to the decision surface. Methods
of the ”Out-of-distribution” literature field analyse the
probability of the current input sample conditioned on the
training data and may thus also look at regions far away
from the decision surface. As adversarial examples may
occur everywhere, methods to detect them come closest
to a general approach for investigating the generalization
area. However, they assume intent and accordingly have a
tendency to ignore some blatant generalization issues, that
do not involve looking at samples that are close in the input
(image) space and far away in the feature space or the other
way around.
A major approach in investigating for a certain input if
the classification output can be trusted, irrespective of the
literature field is to analyse if the input is within the range
of the training data. In particular for metric methods, and
to a lesser extent for inconsistency methods, this approach
is complemented by one targeting the way information is
processed within the DNN.
Given the fact that until now the generalization questions
have been treated mostly in separated rather application-
related setups, it is difficult to tell beyond doubt which
method or class of methods holds the best promise for
deciding if a sample is within the generalization area of
a DNN. In general there are many promising approaches.
For example, metric methods are currently in the focus of
research in all literature fields when judging by the number
of publications. In particular the adversarial-example setup
constitutes a very active research field that we believe has
much to profit from becoming more aware of the other
related fields.
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